Applying detailed consecutive daily micro data at the gasoline station level from Sweden we estimate a structural model to uncover the degree of competition in the gasoline retail market.
Introduction
The same pattern is present in most countries: Gasoline markets are highly concentrated upstream, consisting of tight oligopolies, but often with a dispersed downstream retail market where the individual gasoline stations are operated through various vertical contract arrangements. One important question raised is whether upstream market concentration restricts the level of competition downstream. The market structure has motivated much attention from both regulators and researchers, where pricing strategies and competition are studied.
1 Local competition, brand identity and contractual arrangements are all factors that the literature has pointed to in the understanding of the competitive pressure in this market.
We study the competitive situation in the gasoline retail sector, scrutinizing in particular the impact of local market conditions and station characteristics on stations' competitive grounds. Specifically, in this paper we do the following. First, having access to detailed daily micro data at the station level, both on price and quantity, we estimate a structural model to uncover the degree of competition. Hence, we overcome one substantial limitation of previous studies, which, while endowed with rich price measures, often have to settle for aggregated quantity measures (see e.g. Noel, 2016 for a survey). In contrast, our volume and price data share the same frequency. Second, utilizing detailed knowledge on each station's (i) brand identity and contractual arrangements, (ii) station amenities and (iii) local competition factors,
we extend the model to analyze how these factors impact the competition level. We are thus able to address a relatively large but yet non-conclusive empirical literature on how competition in gasoline retailing relates to local station characteristics. Whereas most of the previous literature typically focuses on either one or two of these factors, we look at all three issues in this paper. 2 We analyze the Swedish market, which shares features with most concentrated national gasoline markets. At the upstream level, the market consists of four major companies having 99% of the market during the sample period. As in many other countries, antitrust concerns have been raised on several occasions. In 2005, the Swedish Market Court found the major oil companies guilty of illegal cooperation. They were sentenced for, among other things, coordinated rebate reductions, internal agreements not to compete for customers among themselves, and agreements on increasing the retail price (Swedish Market Court, 2005) . As a result, the companies paid 112 million SEK in fines. Between 2007 and 2010, the market went through four major mergers, thereby increasing concentration further. Later, in 2012, due to worries on the potential lack of competition, the Swedish government required the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) to initiate studies of the market structure in the industry. 3 We estimate a structural model of demand and supply at the retail level using the method suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) . Endowed with a panel of daily quantity and price data at the station level for a whole consecutive year (2012), together with detailed information on the competitive situation, including distance to competitors, number of stations, ownership and contractual status, station amenities and demography on local markets, we provide estimates of the degree of market power. The richness of the data, consisting of daily price and quantity measures for 180 sample stations, allows us to introduce structure into the model. 4 For the majority of previous literature, detailed volume data have been unavailable (as far as we are aware, exceptions are Slade, 1987 and Wang, 2009) , restricting research to mainly study reduced form models using aggregate data. Others have employed proxies of quantity (e.g., Lewis, 2011) , which are exposed to measurement errors. The gasoline market is divided into several local markets due to geographical restrictions; applying aggregate data might lead to imprecise insights into the local competition conditions. As such, we are in a favorable position to study the problem at hand. We get around both limitations in terms of measurement errors and aggregation biases, and, combined with information on local market characteristics and station amenities, we establish a yet unexplored channel of insights into a highly explored market.
3 As a result, the SCA initiated two studies of the competitive structure of the Swedish retail market, see Foros and Steen (2013) and Ganslandt and Rönnholm (2014) . 4 Our data originate from an analysis performed by Foros and Steen (2013) initiated by the SCA. To obtain sufficient micro information at the station level 180 stations were picked for the calendar year 2012. The data were collected by the NCA, and stations were chosen to be representative for the whole of the Swedish market. For instance, the analysis covered all companies for different regional areas in Sweden in terms of urban and regional status as well as various city sizes. In our sample the highway market is also included as a separate group.
Our demand estimates suggest an inelastic gasoline demand at the market level (significant negative elasticity of 0.72), which is in line with several other studies. The
Bresnahan-Lau approach requires adding interaction terms between exogenous demand side variables and the retail price in the demand specification. Changes in these variables both shift and pivot the demand curve, hence the degree of market power is identified through these terms.
Therefore, a critical requirement for this identification process to work empirically is that the exogenous demand variables chosen enter the demand equation in a well-behaved fashion. We use local income, local population and supply of public transportation in the region in these price interactions. They all come in significant, and produce reasonable and significant elasticities. The income elasticity suggests a normal good (elasticity=1.12) and an increased supply of public transportation reduces demand (elasticity=-0.44), suggesting substitutability, both elasticities also being significant. The interaction term with local population size is significant, and the elasticity suggests a marginal positive demand effect of 0.01, though not significant.
Using the information from the demand estimates we identify market power through the estimated supply relations. We find that retailers do exercise some (significant) market power in the Swedish market, but despite the high upstream concentration, the market power is very limited on the downstream level. This result is in line with what others have found using much more aggregated data (Houde, 2012; Manuszak, 2009) .
Despite the very modest findings of market power, the competitive level varies significantly with local retail station characteristics. First, we estimate separate models where we control for the different characteristics in turn. When it comes to local competition, we
show that the degree of market power varies with both the distance to the nearest gasoline station and with the local density of stations. A station with no competitors within a distance of 5 km or more, as compared to a station with the nearest competitor very close by (like 20 meters) has twice as high markup as the average station. High station density within a radius of 3 km also lowers market power. Gasoline station amenities are a potential source to differences in market power, as a higher level of service tends to raise a seller's market power. In particular, we find that self-service stations have close to no market power. Finally, contractual form and brand identity seem to matter, too. However, we are not able to distinguish the effects fully in the sense that the only brand in our data which operates commissioned gasoline stations (and only such stations) also has a significantly higher markup than the other brands which predominantly have fully vertically integrated gasoline stations.
When controlling for all three characteristics (local competition, amenities and brand/contractual form) in the same models simultaneously, our results generally indicate higher market power. Further, we find similar effects for the three groups of retail station characteristics as we do when estimating them separately. Indeed, there is one clear result: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market power for the local gasoline station.
To illustrate our results, we construct estimates for two stations with different local competitive characteristics. We show that differences in local station characteristics, even within the scope of the variation in our sample, have a large effect on local market power. The magnitude in these local differences implies that in some local markets, the station will be able to extract market power. In other markets, local competition factors will remove this possibility.
Hence, we both establish the effects of local station characteristics on market power and show that these differences can more than offset the average market power found in the baseline model where we do not account directly for these effects on the estimated markup.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the literature on measurement of market power and provide an overview of the most common sources of market power in gasoline retailing. Section 3 presents the structural Bresnahan-Lau model, while Section 4 decribes the data and the industry. Section 5 presents the empirical specification of the Bresnahan-Lau model. The results are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Literature review

Measuring market power in gasoline retailing
Previous literature suggests several factors that might impact local price competition in retail gasoline markets. These are mainly demographics, station amenities, contractual forms, and station location and density. The majority of empirical studies look at the retail price as a function of independent determinants and derive the potential effects on competition from these results. Data from several different countries, e.g. the US, Canada, Australia and European countries, are used. Our approach is to estimate the market power parameter directly by applying the oligopoly model by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) . To the best of our knowledge, few papers estimate the degree of market power explicitly, and no study has yet used the Bresnahan-Lau method in examining gasoline retailing. In addition, many studies relate the degree of market power of retailers to how retail prices and margins respond to changes in input prices. For instance, Borenstein and Shepard (1996) examine price patterns that are consistent with models of tacit collusion and find that retail margins are higher when the wholesale price is anticipated to fall as predicted by these models. Further, Borenstein et al. (1997) and Deltas (2008) relate asymmetric response of retail prices to wholesale price changes to market power of retailers by estimating lag adjustment models.
and McComb (2003) , Shaffer (2002; ) Suominen (1994 , for petroleum: Considine (2001) , for cement: Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) , for cigarettes: Delipalla and O'Donnel (2001) , for beef processing: Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) ; for salmon: Steen and Salvanes (1999) ; for sugar: Genesove and Mullin (1998) ; for advertising: Jung and Seldon (1995) , for lumber: Bernstein (1994) , for coconut oil: Buschena and Perloff (1991) and for electricity: Puller (2007) and Graf and Wozabal (2013) .
Sources of market power in gasoline retailing
Local competition
When it comes to local competition, studies have found ambiguous relations between station density and price. On the one hand, Barron et al. (2004) , Barron and Waddel (2007) and Clemenz and Gugler (2006) show that higher station density tends to lower average prices, suggesting that a higher number of sellers raises local competition. This is in line with our findings, which propose that a seller's market power decreases in the number of neighbour stations. Similarly, Alderighi and Baudino (2015) suggest that stations' prices rely on neighbour stations' prices within around 1km. On the other hand, Hosken et al. (2008) find no relation.
However, they show that price tends to increase with the distance to the closest station.
Comparable results are found by Cooper and Jones (2007) . We cannot directly relate our findings to these, as we do not examine the effect on price explicitly. Nonetheless, we show that a seller's market power parameter tends to increase with the distance to the closest competitor and decrease with station density. Firgo et al. (2015) suggest that sellers who have a central location in a market relative to their competitors in a market have a stronger influence on pricing decisions of competitors and on the equilibrium market price.
Station amenities
Regarding the impact of station amenities on prices and competition, previous studies provide mixed results. Eckert and West (2005) find that local market structure and station characteristics affect sellers' (uniform) price setting and suggest the presence of imperfect competition. Haucap et al. (2017) document that prices are positively related to station service levels. In contrast, Hosken et al. (2008) find no impact of station amenities.
Brand identity and contractual forms
Turning to the effect of contractual forms and brand identity, Eckert and West (2005) show that major brand stations with supplier control are more likely to set the market mode price, suggesting that the presence of vertically integrated major brand stations might increase incentives to tacitly collude. Cooper and Jones (2007) document that interbrand competition is more intensive than intrabrand competition. Hastings (2004) finds that the presence of independent retailers serves to decrease prices due to higher local price competition, while Verlinda (2008) finds that brand identity impacts how sellers respond to cost shocks, suggesting that asymmetric price responses may be explained by local market power.
The Bresnahan-Lau model
We make use of the Bresnahan-Lau model, after Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) . By simultaneous estimation of market demand and a cost relation, a parameter referring to the level of competition in the market is identifiable.
Market demand is described by the function
where is aggregate quantity, is price, is a vector of exogenous demand side variables, a vector of parameters which are to be estimated and the error term.
Under the assumption that sellers are profit maximizing, the structure of the supply side depends on whether sellers are price-takers or not. Under perfect competition, the first-order condition of the profit maximization problem leads to price equal to marginal cost (·), which can be written as
where is a vector of exogenous supply side variables, a vector of supply side parameters and the error term. However, if sellers are not price takers, perceived marginal revenue is set equal to marginal cost. The price relation is then 6 = ( , ; ) − ℎ( , ; ) + .
ℎ(·) is defined as
Hence, + ℎ(·) is industry marginal revenue while + ℎ(·) is the seller's perceived marginal revenue. can be interpreted as the industry average conjectural variation elasticity, where firm 's conjectural variation elasticity is (Dickson, 1981) ; Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) show that by interacting exogenous demand side variables with in the demand specification, changes in these variables both shift and pivot the demand curve such that can be econometrically identified. Formally, assuming that both the demand function and the marginal cost function are linear, the latter of which is given by (·) = 0 + 1 + 2 , the simultaneous equation system consisting of the demand and supply relation is
By first estimating Eq. (6) of the equation system, 1 and 3 can be treated as known parameters. In Eq. (7), there are two included endogenous variables, and * = /( 1 + 3 ), and two excluded exogenous variables, and . The term 3 allows separation between and * = /( 1 + 3 ) and hence identification of . If is omitted in Eq. (6), * = / 1 . Then, we would have two structural parameters and 1 , but only one estimate based on the coefficient of . The supply relation is still identified, but we would not know whether we have to do with the case of = (·) or = (·). Hence, inclusion of the interaction term is crucial for identification of the level of competition in the market.
The Bresnahan-Lau model along with other conjectural variation (CV) models received critique in the late nineties for being atheoretical, in particular from Corts (1999) . His argument is that inference regarding the extent of market power cannot be made without specifying underlying behavior. More specifically, he argues that the mapping between equilibrium variation and the equilibrium value of the elasticity-adjusted price cost margin is not valid, unless average and marginal responses of margins to demand shifters are the same. However, at the same time Genesove and Mullin (1998) assessed actual, as opposed to potential, bias in CV models as predicted by Corts, using data on observed costs and margins in the sugar refining industry. The sugar refining industry's very simple fixed coefficient technology serves as an 7 Note that the inverse demand function is
If there is monopoly pricing, the equilibrium condition is (·) = , and solving for we obtain = 0 − ( /( 1 + 3 )) + 1 + 2 . It follows that the econometric specification for supply is = 0 − ( /( 1 + 3 )) + 1 + 2 + (or, alternatively, = 0 + (− /( 1 + 3 )) + 1 + 2 + ).
objective benchmark to the estimated models. (2017) is set equal to a conduct parameter in the fashion of Bresnahan (1989) and Genesove and Mullin (1998) .
Overview of industry and data
Industry characteristics
During the sample period, there are four major companies in the Swedish market; Statoil 8 Of these brands, Jet and St1 only operate self-serviced retail stations. 9 Typically, the other stations are small. As opposed to the 99.6% market share in volumes, the four firms have more than ten percentage points fewer stations (89%). 10 In gasoline retailing, the most common contract types are (i) company-owned contracts, which correspond to full vertical integration, (ii) franchising contracts which assign some control to the upstream firm, and (iii) opendealer contracts at the other end, corresponding to full vertical separation (Shepard, 1993) .
Market power is a highly relevant issue in this industry, hence assessing the degree of competition in the market is important. This is underlined both by the vast existing general literature on the topic, and, more specifically, by a high focus on the part of the regulators on competition challenges in the Swedish gasoline market. In 2005 the Swedish Market Court found the major oil companies were found of illegal cooperation during the year 1999. They were penalized for, among other things, coordinated rebate reductions in order to sort customers into different groups, internal agreements not to compete for customers among themselves, and agreements on increasing the retail price (Swedish Market Court, 2005) . Common for these actions was their potential to soften competition. In total, the companies paid 112 million SEK in fines. 11 At that time, there were six major companies operating; OK-Q8 (market share 26.20%), Statoil (24.0%), Shell (16.70%), Hydro (11.9%), Preem (10.90%) and Jet (8.3%) (Foros and Steen, 2013) . This corresponds to a Herfindahl index of 1 874, which is lower than the 2012 level. The growth in concentration is mainly due to four major mergers taking place between 2007 and 2010. 12 This also led to steadily increasing gross margins over the period by around 30%. 13 Later, in 2012, and partly due to this development and worries about the potential lack of competition, the SCA was required by the government to initiate studies of the market structure in this market. 
Data
The data period is 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 and the sample consists of 180 stations. Sample stations are from four different geographical regions. These are «larger cities» (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo, the respective first, second, and third largest cities in Sweden), «smaller cities» (cities with population of between 33 000 and 80 000), «E6 highway» 15 and «rural areas» (population below 10 000). Regions can be subdivided into counties and municipalities. 16 An overview of station and municipality distribution for the sample is provided in (Ganslandt and Rönnholm, 2014) . 13 See report by the Swedish Competition Authorities (2013), in particular Figure 3 .11, p 123. 14 As a result, the Swedish CA initiated two studies of the competitive structure of the Swedish gasoline retail market, see Foros and Steen (2013) and Ganslandt and Rönnholm (2014) . 15 E6 is a part of the international E-road network. We consider it a separate geographical region as customers who frequent stations along the highway mostly are busy highway commuters. Further, it is likely that demand around highways is more variable in relation to weekends and holidays. 16 Sweden is divided into 21 counties and 290 municipalities. Some counties are represented in several of the geographical regions because the E6 highway is located near several larger and smaller cities. Our sample consists of observations from 14 distinct counties. Information on station characteristics and facilities includes the distance to the nearest, second nearest and third nearest competitor, as well as which company a station belongs to.
These data are obtained from the firms through the SCA. From the information on distance to the nearest competitors, we compute the number of stations within three km from each seller, which we use as a measure of station density. Further, a carwash indicator and a self-service indicator are obtained from the petroleum companies' websites.
17 Transport Analysis (STA) based on the stations' location, using their addresses. These data are either at the municipality or the county level and are either quarterly or yearly data. A complete overview of data and sources as presented in Table 2 . Table 3 . 
Empirical specification of the Bresnahan Lau model
The first equation in our simultaneous equation system is the demand function
where indexes station and indexes day of the week. is the daily volume sold in liters and is the price per liter at station at time t. is a × 1 column vector of exogenous variables consisting of average disposable income, average disposable income squared and the population in the municipality. Furthermore, the number of 1000 kilometers driven by public transportation per capita is included in the . By including an income variable, we take the income effect into account, while inclusion of a public transportation measure allows for a substitution effect. The size of the population obviously impacts the quantity demanded as it serves as a measure market size and is hence a potential determinant of fuel consumption. In the theory section we showed that the inclusion of interactions between variables in and are crucial for the identification of the supply side equation. Thus, there are four interaction terms included in our demand model.
We also include additional exogenous variables which do not interact with in the × 1 column vector , consisting of the number of stations in the regional county, distance to the nearest competitor and a dummy for whether station is self-serviced or not. In addition, includes a full set of day-of-the-week dummy variables using Monday as baseline, a full set of month dummy variables using January as baseline, and a full set of region dummy variables (Foros and Steen, 2013) . We include three regional dummy variables, one for smaller cities, one for rural areas and one for E6 highway stations. The larger cities serve as reference category. A complete overview of variable definitions, data source, granularity and frequency is presented in Section 4. Finally, is the idiosyncratic error term representing unobserved factors which have an impact on the quantity demanded on each station.
The supply specification is
where
. is a × 1 column vector of exogenous supply side variables consisting of the daily wholesale price, a dummy for whether station offers carwash or not, a dummy for whether station is self-serviced or not, a full set of month dummy variables, a full set of region dummy variables, contractual form dummies and a full set of brand dummy variables. 20 is the idiosyncratic error term which represents unobserved differences in sellers' marginal costs while is the actual quantity sold at station on day .
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A fundamental endogeneity problem arises as quantity demanded affects the price sellers set, while price setting also affects the quantity demanded by consumers. Hence, the two variables of interest are simultaneously determined within the model, causing to be correlated with in Eq. (8) and, likewise, to be correlated with in Eq. (9). To correct 20 The variables included in have an impact on a seller's marginal costs. Consequently, by using as the left hand side variable we can estimate the supply relation without knowing marginal costs. 21 In order to estimate the equations and impose market clearing, we assume that prices clear the market, allowing us to treat as the equilibrium quantity. We believe this is a reasonable assumption to make since the Swedish retail market is not under governmental regulation neither at the demand, nor the supply side during the sample period.
for the biases, we apply two stage least squares (2SLS). We use the wholesale price as an instrumental variable for in the demand equation. In the supply relation, the variables included in are used as instrumental variables for .
We use the wholesale price as an instrument for because the wholesale price is the main input cost for gasoline and is hence a valid instrument. 22 Further, there is no obvious direct relationship between the cost of input factors and the quantity demanded in the retail market, implying that the wholesale price is uncorrelated with . This instrument thus generates exogenous variation related to which we can take advantage of when estimating the impact of the retail price on quantity demanded. is instrumented by the variables; namely the average disposable income, the average disposable income squared, the size of the local population and the regional supply of public transportation. These variables are all good candidates as they directly influence gasoline consumption through a positive income or negative substitution effect, and through the fact that an increase in the population increases the demand for cars and fuel. However, they have no clear partial effect on the retail price or factors determining sellers' marginal costs, therefore being uncorrelated with .
Data differ in various dimensions. The main variables Q and P vary from day to day and between stations. Wholesale price varies from day to day. Station characteristics are fixed over time, but have significant variation across stations. The remaining independent variables vary across either municipality or county, but are fixed over time. 23 In order to use all within and between variation across different dimensions, we use pooled OLS as an estimation method (Baltagi and Griffin, 1983 
Empirical results
Market power in the Swedish retail gasoline market
Demand
Results for the demand equation (8) together with elasticities are presented in Table 4 . 24 Due to the interaction terms, parameter values and corresponding signs give little direct intuition. As such, elasticities are a better measure in order to gain intuition.
The average price elasticity is estimated to be -0.72 and is significant, implying that gasoline demand is downward sloping and inelastic to responses in fuel price. The income elasticity is positive, significant and slightly larger than one (1.11), meaning that gasoline is a normal good. 25 Results are within the range of elasticities found in other demand studies.
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Further, as εY is higher than εP, holding all other factors fixed, the demand for gasoline will increase for proportional increases in income and price.
The elasticity of public transportation proposes that better access to public transportation lowers the gasoline demand with a negative significant elasticity of -0.44. Hence, public transportation is a substitute for car travel, although not a perfect one. The population elasticity is marginally positive, though not significant. Being careful in interpreting a low insignificant number, this still suggests that the number of licensed drivers rises with population, which in turn increases the gasoline consumption. Contrary to expectations, although elasticities are small, the effect of the number of stations is positive, while the effect of the distance to competitor is negative. Larger markets typically have more stations, which suggests higher market demand. Likewise, in a dense market, the distance to the closest competitor is lower than in less dense markets, where the distance between outlets is larger. This we attribute to our control for market size, which is defined at the regional level, and thus very likely too wide to fully account for all cross-market differences. The local market effects instead turn out through our elasticities for distance to competitors and number of stations. 24 Consider the simplified demand equation; = 0 + 1 + + . Then, the elasticity of Z is given by = ( + )( / ), where we use sample means of P, Z and Q. 25 When testing the hypothesis H 0 : ε Y =1, we reject the hypothesis at the 1% level. Thus, the income elasticity is significantly higher than 1. 26 See e.g. the survey by Basso and Oum (2007) , as well as Johansson and Schipper (1997) and Baltagi and Griffin (1983) for OECD-countries and Yatchew and No (2001) for Canada. Focusing on the interaction terms, we see that coefficients are strongly significant, which is important in order to identify the coefficient of Q* in the supply equations. In total, the demand function behaves well and proposes plausible predictions.
Supply
Turning to the supply relation, baseline estimation results of Eq. (9) are presented in Table 5 .
All variables come in significantly and with anticipated signs. The marginal effects are difficult to interpret directly and we have therefore provided elasticities in the table as well. Marginal costs are increasing in Q, but only marginally (elasticity=0.002). Increases in the wholesale price also raises costs (elasticity=0.39), but due to the high data frequency and only one year of data we do not find full pass-through. The station amenity variables both influence costs; self-service reduces costs (elasticity=-0.002), whereas car-wash facilities increase costs (elasticity=0.002).
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Scrutinizing the markup parameter, the model predicts to be significant and larger than zero, but very low. An estimate of 0.005 suggests that Swedish gasoline retailing is not a pure competition market. This is in line with several other studies that find that despite high upstream concentration, the retail level does experience competition, e.g., Houde (2012 ), Manuszak (2009 ) and Slade (1987 . This suggests that even though the market is highly concentrated as there are few brands present in the Swedish market, there is sufficient competition between sellers at the retail level.
28
However, in the baseline model we do not identify to which extent potential effects on the firms' markup level depend on station characteristics. The literature points in particular to three groups of station characteristics that might influence the level of market power locally; (i) local competition level, (ii) station amenities and (iii) brand identity and contract forms. We will look at these groups in turn below.
Sources of local market power
Local competition
To analyze the effects of local competition, we estimate modified supply relations (Eq.
(9)) where we interact Q* with variables that measure local competition. The variables are alternative measures of closeness to competitors. The first is distance to competitor, and the second is station density. Results are presented in Table 6 .
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Both models perform in the same manner as our baseline model. The new interaction terms both suggest that local competition level influences market power. The larger the distance to the nearest competitor, the higher is the market power. Likewise, the more stations within the close vicinity, the less market power is attainable for the stations. 27 The instruments perform well in both models. The 1 st stage adjusted R 2 of Eq. (8) and (9) are 0.999 and 0.689 for the demand function and the supply relation, respectively. 28 According to Corts (1999) , the CV models perform poorly only when the estimated market power as measured by is large (Genesove and Mullin, 1998) . We find only a very modest level of market power. 29 There are fewer observations used in the estimation of the models in Table 6 because information about distance to the nearest sellers is missing for some stations. We do not replace missing values in order to avoid smoothing effects. However, results are qualitatively the same when replacing missing values with the mean value for each distance variable in each county. Taking a closer look at the coefficients, we can get an idea of how sizeable the effect of local competition is. The distance to competitor coefficient is 0.001 and the interpretation is as follows: If the distance to the nearest rival of seller i increases by one km, seller i's markup increases with 0.001. Hence, the total effect of Q* for a station with a distance of one km to its closest rival is 0.005 + 0.001 = 0.006, and the effect is significant. Thus, this coefficient scales the markup according to the distance to the closest competitor. The average station in our sample is located 1.82 km from its closest competitor. The distance variable has, however, a rather high variation, and varies from 0.02 to 30 km across all stations in the sample. This implies for instance, that if we compare a station with no competitors closer than 5 km to a station with a next-door neighbour station, the baseline markup parameter from Table 5 is doubled. Obviously, though one should be careful with the interpretation when we are far away from the mean value, rural stations are typically a long distances away from their neighbours, and they will have substantially more market power than those who have close competitors.
This suggests that the longer the distance between outlets, the higher market power each seller will have because the fuel they offer is more horizontally differentiated from the consumers' point of view. Intuitively, a la Hotelling (1929) , the further the distance to the closest competitor, the more consumers are in seller i's "backyard" and hence regard seller i as the most preferred seller, other things equal.
In column (B), we interact Q* with station density. The baseline estimate of is now 0.008, and slightly higher compared to the benchmark; however it is still small, but positive and significant. The interaction-term coefficient is negative, implying that if seller i faces an additional outlet within its neighbourhood (3 km radius), its market power decreases to 0.008 + (-0.001) = 0.007. One possible explanation to this is that the higher the station density, the more stations are within each consumer's reach and so each seller's good has more substitutes.
Other things equal, increasing spatial competition thus reduces each seller's market power.
However, the station density variable has less variation than the distance to competitor variable, with a minimum of zero, a maximum of 4, and an average of 2.4. This implies that the maximum scope for this variable (4×-0.001) is lower than for the distance to competitor variable. This gives some support to the findings of Hosken et al. (2008) , namely that nearness to the closest competitor is more important than density.
In total, results indicate that raising the density of stations or lowering distance between sellers have a detrimental effect on each seller's markup and hence a positive effect on local competition. These findings are in line with those of Barron et al. (2004) , Barron et al. (2007) and Clemenz and Gugler (2006) .
Station Amenities
We move on to examine station amenities. From Table 1 we see that for our price and quantity observations, 31% of our sample have carwash amenities, 36% are self-service stations and 33% are full service stations without carwash. We want to examine to which extent these differences in service level affect market power. Using the full service stations without carwash amenities as reference category, we interact Q* with carwash and self-service and estimate the supply relation (Eq. (9)). We present the results in Table 7 . Again, we find signs, parameter magnitudes and significance as in our baseline model. This suggests that market power increases with station service level. One explanation is that a seller might be able to charge a markup that covers more than the actual cost of providing service to customers. Our findings have some similarities to the results of Haucap et al. (2017) , who show that carwash facilities affect retail prices positively, while stations without store facilities, tend to have lower prices.
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Our results are also in line with Eckert and West (2005) who find that station characteristics affect sellers' price setting, this as opposed to Hosken et al. (2008) who do not find any impact of station amenities on market power.
Brand identity and contractual forms
Several studies have argued that brand identity and contractual forms affect the stations'
performance. In Table 8 we allow to vary with brand identity. Again, parameters, significance and elasticities are similar to those of our baseline model, and the explanation power is marginally increased.
Preem has a higher than the other brands (0.012), followed by OK-Q8 (0.01), Shell 30 If we only include the carwash interaction, we find some evidence of higher market power for the carwash stations. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between the brand identity effect and the contractual form effect since no other brands are using commissioned agent contracts in our sample. It is, however, not unreasonable to attribute some of this Preem-effect to the contractual form given their smaller market share.
Combining local competition, station amenities and brand identity
We learned above that three characteristics stand out. First, local competition, both measured by closeness to the next gasoline station and by the local density of stations, matters to the amount of market power extracted by the gasoline stations. Second, station amenities are important, especially whether the station is fully serviced or not. Third, we saw that Preem stands out, experiencing significant higher markups than the others, which might be due to their different contact structure in our sample, operating only commissioned agent stations. Now we combine these three characteristics, local competition, station amenities and controlling for Preem, in the same models. Since local competition is controlled for in two different fashions (refer Table 6 ), In Table 9 we estimate two supply relations, one where we interact Q* with distance to the closest competitor and the other two characteristics, the other interacting Q* with station density and these other two characteristics.
As before, the models have similar predictions as the baseline model when it comes to magnitudes for cost parameters and elasticities. The models also have higher explanatory power than the baseline model in Table 5. 31 OK-Q8, Preem and Statoil/Jet had between 600 and 700 stations in 2012. They also sold around a third of the diesel in Sweden in 2012 (Swedish Competition Authorities, 2013) . 32 We have 38 Preem stations in our sample, making up 21% of the sample. The remaining 142 stations are run by the other five brands, whereof as many as 136 are fully vertically integrated (96%). In our sample we only see 2 franchised and 4 independent stations, out of which 6 are OK-Q8 brands. All the interactions between Q* and the station characteristics are significant in both models, and Q* is even more precisely estimated than in the baseline model. In sum, both the models in Table 9 perform better than the baseline model, suggesting that we can estimate the markup more precisely when we also account for the different sources of market power.
The baseline estimate of Q* in the station density model is higher in this combined model than in all the other models. Also, the distance to the closest competitor model suggests a high baseline estimate of Q*. When looking at the marginal effects of the characteristics measured through the interactions with Q*, these have the same signs as above.
Looking at local competition effects, the effect of distance to closest competitor effect is still significant, but smaller in magnitude than what we found in Table 6 . The model with station density suggests a higher negative marginal effect. However, given the variance in these two continuous characteristics (distance and density), the potential influence on market power is still highest from distance to the closest competitor. 33 The station amenity measured through the self-service interaction exactly cancels the baseline effect in the model with distance to the closest competitor, whereas in the station density model we find some significant market power also for self-service stations. The effect of being a Preem and commissioned agent-run station is still significant and positive, and the marginal difference between these commissioned agentrun stations and the other brands' fully vertically integrated stations is increased as compared to Table 8 .
We find a clear result: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market power for the local gasoline station. To illustrate our results, we construct estimates for two stations with different characteristics. First, from our distance to the closest competitor model: Compare a Preem-owned commissioned agent operated full-service station with average distance to its competitor (1.82 km), with one of the other brands' self-service stations, typically vertically integrated, competing with a next door neighbour. The "Preem station" has an estimated markup ( ) of 0.013, the "other station" has no markup (estimated = 0.000008).
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Second, from our station density model: Compare a Preem-owned commissioned agent operated full-service station with an average density of stations (2.4) within a vicinity of three kms, to another brand's vertically integrated self-service station that has four stations within 33 Remember that the variance in the distance to competitor is 0.02 to 30 km whereas the station density variable only varies between 0 and 4 stations. three kms. The "Preem station" has an estimated markup ( ) of 0.015, the "other station" has a marginally negative markup (estimated = -0.002). 35 In sum, though we should be careful when comparing small numbers, local station characteristics influence market power to such an extent that in some local markets, a station will be able to extract market power, whereas in others the competition will remove this possibility.
Concluding remarks
Endowed with detailed consecutive daily micro data at the gasoline station level from Sweden on both prices and quantities we estimate a structural model to uncover the degree of competition in the retail market. We apply a Bresnahan-Lau (1988) The paper addresses a relatively large but still non-conclusive empirical literature on how competition in gasoline retailing relates to local station characteristics. Micro data at the station level on both quantity and price have typically been hard to obtain, restricting previous research to mainly study aggregate data and reduced form models. Our approach is thus different from the majority of previous literature, both due to the richness of our data, and because we can combine several local station characteristics within the same model.
Our demand estimates suggest an inelastic gasoline demand, which is in line with other studies of gasoline markets. The Bresnahan-Lau approach requires adding interaction terms between exogenous demand side variables and the retail price in the demand specification. We use local income, local population and supply of public transportation in the region in these price interactions. They all come in significant, and produce reasonable and significant elasticities. The income elasticity suggests a normal good, and an increased supply of public transportation reduces demand, suggesting substitutability, both elasticities also being significant. The interaction term with local population size is significant, and the elasticity proposes a marginal positive demand effect, though not significant. Using the information from the demand estimates, we identify market power through our estimated supply relations. We find that retailers do exercise some market power in the Swedish market on average, but despite the high upstream concentration also in Sweden (C4=99%), the market power is very limited on the downstream level.
Despite the very modest findings of market power, the competitive level varies significantly with local retail station characteristics such as the degree of local competition, station amenities and brand identity/contractual form. We show that the degree of market power varies with both the distance to the nearest station and the local density of gasoline stations. A higher level of service tends to raise a seller's market power, in particular we find that selfservice stations have close to no market power. Finally, contractual form and brand identity are also found to matter, but we are not able to distinguish the effects fully in the sense that the only brand in our sample (Preem) that operates commissioned gasoline stations (and only such stations) also have a significantly higher markup than the other brands that predominantly have fully vertically integrated stations.
Swedish Competition Authorities stated in 2013 (p.128) "…the stations' gross margins naturally vary over time and depend on the local competition pressure.". We find a clear result reflecting this observation: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market power for the local gasoline stations. We show that differences in local station characteristics, even within the scope of the variation in our sample, have a large effect on local market power.
The results show that the magnitude of these local differences implies that in some local markets, a station will be able to extract market power, in other markets the local competition factors will remove this possibility.
Hence, not only do we establish the effects of differences and importance in local station characteristics on market power, our results also indicate that local differences in station characteristics can more than offset the average market power found in our baseline models.
